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DEFAMATION IN FICTION: THE NEED
FOR A CLEAR "OF AND CONCERNING"
STANDARD*
RICHARD C. GILLER, EsQ.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Fiction has been variously defined as being the "conscious an-
tithesis of truth"' as well as a "genre that, by definition, is factu-
ally false."'2 Having been so characterized it is difficult to compre-
hend how such a literary form could spawn so many defamation
suits. The common law elements of defamation3 appear, at first
glance, to defy application to fictional works. Indeed, an art form
which by definition contains false statements of fantasy seems in-
apposite to a defamation action.
The difficulty does not arise in the area of pure fantasy, but
rather when the author mixes fact with fiction. It is true that most
fictional works have some basis in fact, whether it is something the
author has actually experienced or merely something he has
heard.4
It is equally true that when a person purchases a novel he ex-
pects to read fiction and not facts. An author may, however, be put
in the position of defending a defamation suit if he uses sufficient
* © 1986. Richard C. Giller.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, B.A., College of
the Holy Cross, 1981; J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 1984. Member of the
Bar of the State of California; Associate, McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea, Los Angeles,
California.
1. Sphan v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d
832 (1967) (Bergan, J., dissenting).
2. Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment Protec-
tion, 29 AM. U.L. R v. 571, 582 (1980).
3. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
4. See People v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1959).
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facts to allow a reasonable reader to understand that the fictional
work is "of and concerning" the plaintiff.5
Applying the law of defamation to the genre of fiction has
proven to be a difficult task for the courts, with the resulting deci-
sions merely obscuring the issues. Two recent decisions, Bindrim v.
Mitchell' and Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., have served
only to inject further confusion into the application of a defama-
tion cause of action to fiction. This confusion has led one commen-
tator to proffer the idea that fiction should be afforded absolute
first amendment protection.8 Yet other writers believe that abso-
lute protection is inappropriate and propose, rather, that the con-
stitutional requirement of "fault" be added to the common law ele-
ments of defamation.9
The scope of this article is limited. 10 The first section of this
article discusses the application of the law of defamation to the
genre of fiction and is offered in order to familiarize the reader
with this area of the law. The second section of this article consists
of a detailed analysis of the various of and concerning standards
developed by courts through the years. The third portion under-
takes a critical examination of Bindrim and Pring to illustrate the
need for a clearly delineated judicial standard. Finally, this article
will propose such a standard by harmonizing the variety of tests
that have been proposed.
II. DEFAMATION AND FICTION
The elements of a prima facie case of defamation are: (1) a
false and defamatory statement of fact; (2) of and concerning the
plaintiff; (3) which is communicated to a third party, either negli-
gently or intentionally, by the defendant; and (4) which injures the
5. One commentator has written: "Once readers perceive that a writer has mingled
some facts with fiction, there is a risk that they will see mingling where none was intended.
The more subtle or ambiguous the intentional mingling becomes, the greater the risk that
readers will make this mistake." Anderson, Avoiding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51
BROOKLYN L. REv. 383, 392-93 (1985). See Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d
141 (4th Cir. 1969).
6. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). Justices
Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dissented from the denial of certiorari, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
. 7. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) rev'g No. C79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
8. See Comment, supra note 2, at 572.
9. Franklin & Trager, Literature and Libel, 4 CoM./EN'. 205, 233 (1982).
10. The scope of this article is strictly limited to a discussion of the of and concerning
requirement of defamation actions based upon fictional works. Other articles have devoted a
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plaintiff's reputation." Although a plaintiff is required to prove
each of these elements, in cases involving fictional works the cen-
tral issue is whether the plaintiff can be identified with the fic-
tional character.12 This crucial element is known synonomously as
the identification element and the of and concerning element.13 In
works of fiction this issue is often the most difficult to establish
"because the author has stated explicitly that the material is ficti-
tious or because the context suggests that it should not be taken
literally. 1 4 However, it is generally recognized in defamation cases
involving fictional works that once a plaintiff has shown that the
defamatory language is "of and concerning him," the outcome is
all but predetermined in favor of the plaintiff. 5
The infusion of constitutional law into the area of defamation
has had a dramatic impact. This development, however, has little
application to fictional works.' 6 In fact, one commentator has gone
so far as to write that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 and its
progeny, have been "misapplied to works of fiction."' 8 As a result,
11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558; Wilson, The Law of Libel
and the Art of Fiction, 44 LAW & CorTEMP. PROBS. 27, 32-33 (1981).
12. Franklin & Trager, supra note 9, at 208.
13. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 111, at 749 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Franklin & Trager, supra note 9, at 208-09.
15. Comment, supra note 2, at 578, n.49; see Comment, Defamation in Fiction: With
Malice Toward None and Punitive Damages for All, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 99, 103 (1983).
16. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional infusion into the area of defamation,
see Franklin, Fiction, Libel, and the First Amendment, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 269 (1985);
Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. Rav.
1065 (1978); Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About Troublesome
Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOKLYN L. REVA 355 (1985); Comment, "Clear and
Convincing" Libel: Fiction and the Law of Defamation, 18 YALE L. J. 520 (1983); Wilson,
supra note 11; Comment, supra note 2.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Comment, supra note 16, at 526, wherein the author stated:
The Supreme Court has suggested, although not in the context of libel litigation,
that works of art and entertainment are entitled to First Amendment protection.
The Court has also stated, however, that "calculated falsehood," "the lie, know-
ingly and deliberately published," deserves no such protection. The two state-
ments seem inconsistent, for works of fiction, while not purporting to be factu-
ally true and therefore not precisely "lies," surely are calculated fabrications.
Because the constitutional law of libel has evolved chiefly in cases concerning
the news media and thus, has dealt with statements purportedly true but actu-
ally false, the Court's pronouncements on the calculated falsehoods that arise in
more typical libel cases have been misapplied to works of fiction. As a result,
such works now enjoy only very limited First Amendment protection.
The precise scope of the Sullivan rule, which assists the news media by giv-
ing them a limited constitutional privilege for erroneously defamatory state-
ments, is meaningless when applied to works of fiction. Actual malice, as the
Bindrim court observed, "concentrates solely on defendants' attitude toward the
truth or falsity of the material published . . . and not on malicious motives."
19861
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this article will not discuss the application, or misapplication, of
the constitutional aspects of defamation laws to fictional works.
The primary focus of this article is on how the of and concerning
element may be satisfied and how and why this issue needs to be
clarified.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE "OF AND CONCERNING" ELEMENT IN
DEFAMATION CASES INVOLVING WORKS OF FICTION
Perhaps the first case to develop a standard to apply in defa-
mation cases involving a work of fiction is the British case of E.
Hulton Co. v. Jones.'9 In Jones, the House of Lords addressed the
issue of whether a plaintiff whose name was used in a fictional
work could sue the publisher of the work for defamation. The
name was the only similarity between the plaintiff and the fictional
character. The test developed in Jones was based upon the reason-
able perceptions of the audience rather than upon the intent of the
author.20 The House of Lords allowed the jury to determine
whether reasonable readers would understand that the plaintiff
was the intended object of the story.2 Thus, the of and concerning
standard to be applied in defamation actions based upon fictional
works, as first enunciated in 1910, was a "reasonable reader"
standard.2"
The first American case to apply the reasonable reader stan-
dard to a work of fiction was Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill, Co.'s Cor-
rigan was a libel action brought by Joseph Corrigan, a magistrate
But because authors are generally in a position to know the truth or falsity of
their own fictional material a jury may-indeed, virtually must-find any alleg-
edly defamatory work to be actually malicious.
Id. (citations omitted) (original in emphasis).
19. (1909] 2 K.B. 44, aff'd, [19101 A.C. 20.
20. See 26 T.L.R. 128 (1909). See also, Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting
Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365 (1912).
One commentator has written that the Jones "reasonable reader test had two elements:
(1) whether the reader believed that the story referred to a real person, or merely a literary
type; and (2) whether the reader believed the story referred to the plaintiff." Comment,
Defamation in Fiction, supra note 15, at 103.
21. 26 T.L.R. 128, 129 [19091. The holding in Jones was summarized by the court as:
Thus, although people who did not know the plaintiff would not reasonably be-
lieve that he was being described, and people who knew the plaintiff well would
not so believe (because many of the facts ascribed to [Jones] were not true of the
plaintiff), liability might nevertheless be found, as people who knew the plain-
tiff-but did not know him well-might have believed that he was the subject of
the article.
Id.
22. 26 T.L.R. 128, 129 [1909].
23. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
[Vol. 3:1
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of the Jefferson Market Court in New York City, against the au-
thor and publisher of the novel God's Man.24 The novel depicted
New York's underworld and contained a chapter in which the hero
appeared before "Justice-ala Cornigan" of the Jefferson Market
Court.2 5 The inference derived from this chapter was that Justice
"Cornigan's" decisions were somehow influenced by political con-
siderations. The court determined "unmistakably that the author.
. . intended.., deliberately and with personal malice to vilify the
plaintiff. ' '2e
The defendants in Corrigan argued that the work was com-
pletely fictitious and was therefore not written about an existing
person or persons. The defendants also argued that they could not
be liable because they did not know the plaintiff and had no intent
to injure him.2 7 In response to the defendant's second argument,
the court simply stated "[t]he question is not so much who was
aimed at as who was hit. '28
The cases decided since Corrigan have been inconsistent in
their rationales, failing to clearly delineate an of and concerning
standard to be applied in defamation actions involving fictional
works. As a general proposition, most courts have used some varia-
tion of the reasonable reader standard when determining the of
and concerning element of defamation in cases involving works of
fiction.2
In Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 0 the court formu-
lated the of and concerning requirement in terms of "whether or
not a considerable and respectable class in the communities where
the defendant's picture was shown would identify the characters as
these two plaintiffs." 81 The requirement that the statements be de-
famatory was couched in similar terms; i.e., whether or not the
work "would tend to discredit the plaintiffs in the view of a consid-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. It would appear that the court in Corrigan imposed an intent standard in their
analysis. Compare the Corrigan court's finding with defendant's argument that they did not
know the plaintiff and had no intent to injure him. Id. at 59, 126 N.E. at 262.
27. Id. at 59, 126 N.E. at 212.
28. Id. It is interesting to note that the two earliest cases in this area both employed
standards that focused on whether the plaintiff was an intended victim. See supra notes 21
and 26 and accompanying texts.
29. See Comment, "Hey, That's Me!"-The Conundrum of Identification in Libel
and Fiction, 18 CAL. W. L. REv. 442, 452 (1982).
30. 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944).
31. Id. at 640.
1986]
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erable and respectable class in the community." 2 The Wright
court dismissed the plaintiffs' action because there was no evidence
that anyone, though they would have had to presumably been
members of a considerable and respectable class in the community,
identified the plaintiffs with their fictional characters. 33
The Wright decision illustrates the unfortunate results of at-
tempting to define the of and concerning element in terms of a
considerable and respectable class in the community. Because the
reasonable reader standard is primarily viewed by the understand-
ing of those to whom the statement is addressed, a court should
delineate the factors involved in determining who a reasonable
reader is before it injects vague terms such as "respectable" or
"considerable" into the analysis.
Four years after Wright, the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts adopted a similar standard. The court in Kelly v.
Loew's, Inc.," stated that "[i]n deciding whether a statement is
defamatory, the rule is to determine what its effect is upon any
respectable, substantial part of the community to which the state-
ment was addressed." 6 The peculiar factual setting in Kelly led
the court to add the requirement that a court look to the "commu-
nity to which the statement was addressed."3 6
Kelly was a libel action brought by a commander in the
United States Navy against the producer of the motion picture
They Were Expendable. The movie, and the book upon which it
was based, involved the deeds of Commander Robert Kelly during
World War II. The book used Commander Kelly's name repeat-
edly. However, the movie, which incorporated the standard dis-
claimer,87 portrayed the exploits of "Rusty Ryan."3 S
Ryan appeared to the general viewing audience as having tre-
mendous virtues. He was a gallant, generous and kind officer with
32. Id.
33. Id. at 641.
34. 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
35. Id. at 486.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 485. An example of a standard disclaimer is: "The persons and events de-
picted in this movie are fictitious and any similarity to actual persons living or dead is
purely coincidental." The court in Kelly labeled this type of disclaimer as a "disingenuous
legend" which would have been ignored by the average viewer.
It has been written that the standard disclaimer "has never been sanctioned in any
reported decision as a successful technique to avoid liability." See Comment, Defamation in
Fiction, supra note 15, at 116.
38. Kelly, 76 F. Supp. at 485. This distinction had no impact on the court's decision
since the "defendant plainly asked the audience to believe-and ... many of them did
believe-that Ryan in the movie was substantially like Kelly in life." Id.
[Vol. 3:1
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an "impetuous eagerness for action."3 9 However to an audience of
Naval officers, Ryan appeared to be "headstrong, undisciplined
[and] resistant to orders."'40 Because the plaintiff was a member of
a professional group, the court reformulated the of and concerning
standard to take into account the inevitable divergence in the un-
derstandings of different audiences.41 On appeal, the First Circuit
defined the identity issue to be "whether to permanent officers of
the United States Navy the portrayal of plaintiff as resembling
Ryan would tend to lower his reputation."42
The court of appeals in Kelly utilized an of and concerning
standard similar to that used in Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
Inc. Although leaving undefined such terms as respectable and
substantial, the Kelly court did narrow the scope of "community"
to the "community to which the statement was addressed." More
specifically, the appeals court narrowed community to the commu-
nity of which the plaintiff was a member.
In 1951 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit offered a
new formulation of the standard to be used when determining
whether the of and concerning element has been satisfied."' In Da-
vis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,4 the court phrased the test as
"whether persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasona-
bly have understood the exhibited picture to refer to him. 4 5 Al-
though the Davis court altered the of and concerning standard to
include only those persons who "knew or knew of the plaintiff,"
identification was still required to be made by reasonable readers.
In fact, the court stated that a cause of action could not be estab-
lished merely by showing that "someone. said he understood that
the character depicted [in the fictional work] referred to plain-
tiff.14 6 A version of the Davis test was applied by the court in
Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co.47
Wheeler was an action for libel and invasion of privacy based
39. Id. at 481.
40. Id. at 475.
41. As stated above, a non-military audience would applaud the exploits of Rusty
Ryan, while an audience of Naval Officers would not approve of Ryan's antics. By limiting
the of and concerning standard to the perceptions of Commander Kelly's peers, the court
implicitly found the work to be defamatory only if Commander Kelly's reputation as a Na-
val Officer was tarnished as a result of this portrayal.
42. Id. at 486.
43. Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1951).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 904 (original emphasis).
46. Id.
47. 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
1986]
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upon the novel and motion picture Anatomy of a Murder. The
work was a fictionalized account of the actual murder trial of Lieu-
tenant Petterson. 5 Petterson had shot and killed Maurice Che-
noweth for the alleged rape of Petterson's wife. Although the novel
and movie were based upon the actual Petterson trial, the names
of the participants and some of their descriptions were altered.49
The novel and movie involved the shooting of Barney Quill by
Lieutenant Manion for the rape of Manion's wife.
The plaintiffs in Wheeler included Hazel Wheeler and Terry
Ann Chenoweth, the widow and surviving daughter respectively of
Maurice Chenoweth.50 Hazel Wheeler alleged that she had been
defamed by and identified with the "unsavory characteristics" of
Janice Quill, the wife of the victim in Anatomy of a Murder.1 The
fictional characters were quite different physically from their real
life counterparts. Janice Quill, for example, was described as "that
dame with the dyed red hair and livid scar on her right cheek who
had sworn at him in everything but Arabian .... ,5 The plaintiff
Hazel Wheeler did not look anything like Janice Quill, nor did Ms.
Wheeler use bad language.
Using a version of the Davis test, the Wheeler court affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants. On appeal the summary judgment was affirmed, even though
the appellate court noted that the events and locale depicted in
the fictional works might suggest to those who knew the Che-
noweth family that Hazel and Janice were one in the same.53 As
the court stated, however, "suggestion is not identification." 5




52. Id. at 376. Terry Ann Chenoweth alleged that she had been identified with "Mary
Pliant," the illegitimate daughter of Barney Quill in the book. However, Ms. Chenoweth
differed greatly from her fictional counterpart. For example, Terry Ann was only nine years
old at the time of the actual trial while Mary was sixteen. In addition, Mary played an
inconspicuous role in both the novel and the movie. These differences between Terry Ann
and Mary led the court to conclude that no cause of action had been stated as to Terry Ann.
Id. at 376.
53. Id.
54. Id. Wheeler involved a "fictionalized account" of an actual murder trial. As a re-
sult, it may be fair to assume that anyone familiar with the real Petterson trial could not
help but identify Lieutenant Manion in the novel with Lieutenant Petterson in real life;
Barney Quill with Maurice Chenoweth; Mary Pilant with Terry Ann Chenoweth; and Janice
Quill with Hazel Wheeler. Accordingly, if a reasonable reader who knew or knew of the
Petterson trial identified one of these fictional characters with their real life counterparts,
.the of an concerning element should have been satisfied here. It was not. The court seemed
content to hold "suggestion is not identification." Id. at 376.
[Vol. 3:1
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The court further noted that Hazel denied having any of the
"unsavory characteristics" of Janice. As a result, those who knew
or knew of Hazel "could not [have] reasonably identiffied] her
with Janice Quill.""5 The Wheeler court ultimately concluded that
"any reasonable person who read the book and was in a position to
identify Hazel Wheeler with Janice Quill would more likely con-
clude that the author created the latter in an ugly way so that
none would identify with Hazel Wheeler."" The Wheeler court
emphasized the dissimilarities between the plaintiffs and their fic-
tional counterparts and sought to determine how a reasonable per-
son who knew the plaintiffs would interpret those differences.
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp.,57 the court focused its attention on how rational
viewers would view the farcical aspects of a fictional work." In No-
tre Dame, a university and its president brought an action based
upon unfair competition and invasion of privacy to enjoin the re-
lease and distribution of a motion picture entitled John Goldfarb,
Please Come Home." Both the movie and the book upon which it
was based related the events surrounding the arrangement and
playing of a collegiate football game.60 The game was played in the
mythical Arab country of Fawzia and pitted the University of No-
tre Dame against Fawz U.61 The trial court granted the injunction.
55. Id. at 376.
56. Id. The issue is whether an author escapes liability by creating a fictional charac-
ter who is physically and emotionally "uglier" than the identifiable real life person upon
whom the characterization is based. In discussing the holding in Wheeler, one writer com-
mented: "the suggestion that because of the uncomplimentary portrayal no one who knew
the real widow could reasonably identify her with the fictional widow, only affirms the con-
clusion that the depiction is defamatory and does not negative the element of identifica-
tion." See Comment, Defamation in Fiction, supra note 15, at 112. If the author in Bindrim
would have created a fictional character who was physically and emotionally "uglier" than
the identifiable real life person upon whom the characterization was based, he would not
have been held liable. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying texts.
57. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965). Notre Dame was an invasion of privacy
action brought under §§ 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act.
58. Id. at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
59. Id. at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
60. The events surrounding the arrangement of the game began when the Moslem
King of Fawzia sent his son to a Catholic college in the United States. When his son was cut
from Notre Dame's football team the King formed his own team at Fawz U. To coach his
team, the King procured the services of a former football star-"Wrong-Way Goldfarb."
Goldfarb was an an American pilot who was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to fly a mission over Russia but had mistakenly landed in Fawzia. The King then
demanded that the United States arrange a football game between Notre Dame and Fawz
U. as the price for allowing the United States to lease an air base in Fawzia. Id. at 455, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 303.
61. The night before the game, the Notre Dame players were dined by the King and
1986]
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On appeal, the court formulated the issue as whether "there
[is] any basis for any inference on the part of rational readers or
viewers that the antics engaging their attention are anything more
than fiction. . . .,6 Although the name Notre Dame was used fre-
quently in both the movie and the book, the court concluded that
a rational audience "know[s] they are not seeing or reading about
real Notre Dame happenings or actual Notre Dame characters
.... Nobody is deceived. Nobody is confused[,] and plainly no-
body was intended to be."63 Therefore, the court lifted the injunc-
tion and dismissed the complaint.0 4
Most of the cases discussed herein have highlighted the dis-
similarities between the plaintiff and the fictional character. 5 In
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin, Co.,e6 the court found the similarities
to be dispositive. Daniel Fetler brought a libel action against the
publisher of the novel The Travelers.*6 Fetler alleged that the
main character, Maxim, was actually "of and concerning himself."
The portrayal of Maxim was alleged to be libelous because it de-
picted the character as willingly cooperating with the Nazis."'
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the
defendant publisher and Fetler appealed. In reviewing whether the
grant of summary judgment was appropriate, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit emphasized the fact that "the ruling below
deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to prove to a jury that the
alleged libel was 'of and concerning' him .... "70 The issue on ap-
"witness[ed] an orgiastic entertainment provided by dancing girls from the royal harem.
The culinary piece de resistance [was] spiced mongoose, renowned for its devastating effect
on even more sophisticated digestive systems than those of American football players." Id.
at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
In addition to all of the other antics, one of the referees of the game was the Chief of
the CIA. However, perhaps the most incredible incidents depicted in the movie occurred
during the final minutes of the football game. At that moment, an American female reporter
entered the game for Fawz U. and scored the winning touchdown when she was carried over
the goal line by a "preposterous oil gusher which erupt[ed] on the football field." Id. at 455,
256 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
62. Id. at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
63. Id. 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
64. The position taken by the court in Notre Dame, that the fictional work was too
ludicrous to be believed, is similar to the position taken by the court in Pring v. Penthouse
International, Ltd.
65. See Wheeler, 300 F.2d 372; Davis, 191 F.2d 901; Kelly, 76 F. Supp. 463; Wright, 55
F. Supp. 639.
66, 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
67. Id. at 651.
68. Id. at 650. It is interesting to note that the author of the novel was in reality the
plaintiff's brother.
69. Id. at 650.
70. Id. at 651.
[Vol. 3:1
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peal therefore was whether a jury, on the undisputed facts, "could
not reasonably conclude" that the fictional character was a por-
trayal of the plaintiff.
71
The Fetler court paid deference to an extensive list of similar-
ities offered by the plaintiff between Fetler and Maxim.7 2 In addi-
tion to these similarities, Fetler, in an affidavit opposing the sum-
mary judgment motion, stated that his brother had told him the
novel "was about our father, the family concerts and me."' 7 In
light of both the affidavit and the list of similarities, the Second
Circuit concluded that "it was difficult to see how a jury could be
characterized as unreasonable if it found that Maxim could reason-
ably be understood as a portrayal of plaintiff Daniel Fetler."
' 4
The defendant in Fetler argued that the many dissimilarities
between the plaintiff and Maxim, rather than the less numerous
similarities, should be controlling."5 However, because the order
below was a grant of summary judgment, the dissimilarities merely
raised an issue of fact as to identification, thereby defeating the
trial court's ruling. In addition, the plaintiff submitted four affida-
vits from readers who identified him from the novel,76 as well as
another affidavit which stated that at least twelve of the plaintiff's
students had asked him whether The Travelers was about his
family."
The Fetler decision appears to be a break from the defamation
in fiction cases decided before it. This is because the focus of the
court was on the similarities between the fictional work and the
plaintiff, rather than merely noting a string of dissimilarities and
then ruling that the of and concerning element had not been satis-
71. Id.
72. The court noted the following similarities:
The novel depicts events in the life of the Solovyov family, composed of a father,
mother, and thirteen children of whom ten are boys and the third, fourth and
eighth are girls. This is the exact composition of the Fetler family. In the novel,
Maxim is the eldest child and is twenty-three years old in 1938; in life, the same
is true of plaintiff. In the novel, Maxim is a Latvian by birth; in fact, plaintiff
although born in Leningrad, was a Latvian citizen at the time the events in the
novel occurred. In the novel, the father is an itinerant Russian Protestant minis-
ter whose wife and children perform as a band and choir where the father
preaches. Maxim is generally responsible for their temporal needs and to that
end dominates them.
364 F.2d at 651.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 653.
76. Id.
77. Id. at n.8.
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fied .7 In essence, the Fetler court held that since there are exten-
sive similarities as well as numerous dissimilarities between the
plaintiff and his fictional counterpart, the court would allow the
jury to weigh the evidence and reach a decision. Rather than deter-
mining on summary judgment whether a reasonable reader, or a
substantial and respectable part of the community, would identify
Daniel Fetler with Maxim, the court in Fetler left that for the jury
to decide.
In Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 79 the court once
again highlighted the dissimilar aspects between the plaintiff and a
fictional character. In Middlebrooks, the court applied a "pure"
reasonable reader test to a fictional short story that had appeared
in the Saturday Evening Post. The short story featured two teen-
age boys living in Columbia, South Carolina. The boys stole a
number of automobile parts to repair their own car. 0 One of the
teenagers in the story was named Esco Brooks.
The plaintiff, Larry Esco Middlebrooks, was a childhood
friend of the author. The two had grown up together in Columbia,
South Carolina.81 Even though the plaintiff produced many wit-
nesses who testified that they believed fictional character Esco
Brooks was in fact modeled on the plaintiff, both the district court
and the Fourth Circuit entered judgment in favor of the
defendants.8"
The Fourth Circuit in Middlebrooks used the traditional test
of "whether '[the fictional character] could reasonably be under-
stood as a portrayal of the plaintiff,' "88 to determine whether the
identification issue had been satisfied. Noting that the short story
was obviously a a fictional work, the Fourth Circuit held that
"[t]he context in which the name appears is important because
'[niames of characters portrayed in . . . obvious works of fiction
78. The decision in Fetter should be compared to that reached by the court in
Wheeler, 300 F.2d at 375. There was evidence presented in both actions that the fictional
work was based upon actual happenings and yet the two cases were decided differently. The
court in Wheeler, emphasizing all of the dissimilarities between the plaintiffs and their fic-
tional counterparts, held that reasonable readers would not identify the characters with the
plaintiffs. In contrast, the court in Fetler, highlighting all of the similarities, reversed a
grant of summary judgment and concluded that the issue of identification was a jury
question.
79. 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969).
80. Id. at 142.
81. Id.
82. Id. Note the "many witnesses" produced in Middlebrooks as compared to the
three witnesses introduced in Bindrim.
83. 413 F.2d at 142 (citations omitted).
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are normally understood by all reasonable men as not intended to
depict or refer to any actual person.' "84
The short story did not "parallel the plaintiff's life in any sig-
nificant manner" and yet the court did not base its holding on the
fact that all of the dissimilarities would cause a reader not to iden-
tify the plaintiff with the fictional character.85 Rather, the court in
Middlebrooks based its decision upon the fact that the reasonable
understanding of most readers is that fictional works are not fac-
tual accounts.8 "
The of and concerning test set-forth in Middlebrooks is
wrought with difficulties. First, the court failed to define what con-
stitutes an "obvious work of fiction." This shortcoming enables
judges to base their decision on no more than a "gut reaction,"
rather than on a tailored legal definition.8 7 Second, by basing its
decision on the fact that reasonable readers understand obvious
works of fiction to be fictitious, the court in Middlebrooks essen-
tially held that "fiction is fiction" and as such, cannot give rise to
defamation actions. Apparently this is because reasonable readers
who read obvious works of fiction presumably realize that the char-
acters depicted therein do not portray actual people no matter how
closely they resemble them.88 Therefore, under the rationale in
Middlebrooks, the of and concerning element of defamation would
never be satisfied by obvious works of fiction.
It is true that a person who purchases a novel probably does
not "take its words as referring literally to the real world."89 Yet,
84. Id. at 143 (citations omitted). This holding is in complete contrast to the "many
witnesses who testified that they believed Esco Brooks was in fact the plaintiff. . . ." See
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
In discussing the contextual reliance by the court in Middlebrooks, one commentator
has written:
When the allegedly defamatory work of fiction appears in a short story, maga-
zine, or collection of short stories (as opposed to a novel or a feature length film),
some courts have looked to a fictional or humorous context to avoid liability on
the theory that the context vitiates the defamatory import of the work.
See Comment, Defamation in Fiction, supra note 15, at 117.
85. 413 F.2d at 143.
86. Id. This "fiction is fiction" ruling is similar to the rationale employed by the courts
in Notre Dame and Pring.
87. This situation is analogous to Justice Stewart's definition of "hard core" pornogra-
phy in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), wherein he stated: "I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not." 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
89. Comment, supra note 16, at 531. See Comment, Fiction Based on Fact: Writers'
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as one writer relates: "despite the common understanding of the
term 'fiction' and the standard disclaimer of resemblance to real
people and events that prefaces many fictional works, many read-
ers seem nonetheless inclined to take fiction, or aspects of fiction,
as the literal truth." 0 As a result, neither the classification of a
work as fiction nor the presence of a disclaimer should be
dispositive 1
Perhaps the best formulation of a standard to determine the
of and concerning element of defamation was set forth in Geisler
v. Petrocelli.e3 Geisler was an action for libel and invasion of pri-
vacy against the author of a book entitled Match Set. The work
was about a female transsexual tennis player in the so-called cor-
rupt world of professional tennis.93 The novel's main character
bore the same name as the plaintiff.
The book purported to be a work of fiction and its jacket con-
tained the standard disclaimer." The court formulated the of and
concerning test to be that a "reasonable reader must rationally
suspect that the protagonist is in fact the plaintiff, notwithstand-
ing the author's and publisher's assurances that the work is fic-
tional."95 In discussing the burden of proof which a plaintiff must
bear in a defamation action, the Second Circuit stated that a plain-
tiff must demonstrate that:
[T]he libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let those
who knew [her] understand that [she] was the person meant. It
is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it
is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out that
[she] is the person meant. 6
Under these standards, the Geisler court concluded that plaintiff's
pleadings were sufficient and that she was entitled to present evi-
dence in support of her claims.9
Three years after Geisler the New York Court of Appeals de-
Liability for Libel and Invasion of Privacy, 14 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (1981).
90. See Comment, supra note 16, at 532.
91. Indeed, the court in Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966)
held that "there was no justification for any reliance by the district judge upon . . . the
usual disclaimer .... " 364 F.2d at 653-54. See also Comment, Defamation by Fiction, 42
MD. L. REV. 405, 407 (1974).
92. 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Id. at 638.
94. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 37 and 91.
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cided Springer v. Viking Press.98 Springer involved a libel action
based upon a novel entitled State of Grace.99 The plaintiff Lisa
Springer alleged that she had been defamed by chapter ten of the
novel. State of Grace concerned the political and financial worlds
of the Vatican. °0° Chapter ten depicted the "origin of one evening
in the relationship between [an] Italian industrialist .. .and his
mistress, Lisa Blake."'' 1 The chapter, which was only ten and one-
half pages long, explicitly depicted the sexual activities of the in-
dustrialist and his mistress.0 2
The plaintiff and her fictional counterpart shared a common
first name as well as some physical similarities. 03 Accordingly, Ms.
Springer asserted that the portrayal of Lisa Blake in the novel was
"of and concerning" herself. Ms. Springer also contended that "a
number of persons . ..knew and understood Blake and plaintiff
to be one and the same person."''
The Springer court phrased the issue on appeal as "whether a
fictional depiction of a person contained in a single chapter of a
novel is so closely related to plaintiff in the minds of people to
whom she is known as to give rise to a cause of action in defama-
tion."'0 5 To resolve this issue, the court undertook a comparison of
98. 60 N.Y.2d 916, 458 N.E.2d 1256, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983), aff'g 90 A.D.2d 315, 457
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982). For a detailed analysis of the Springer decision see Garbus & Kurnit,
Libel Claims Based On Fiction Should Be Lightly Dismissed, 51 BRooKLYN L. REv. 401,
405-10 (1985). The authors of the article are partners in the law firm that represented the
defendants in Springer. The Court of Appeals decision is merely a two paragraph affirma-
tion of the decision of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.
99. Springer, 60 N.Y.2d at 919, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
100. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
101. Id. The Court of Appeals was a bit more direct in its characterization of Lisa
Blake's role in the novel. The Court of Appeals stated:
We agree with the Appellate Division that whether the complaint sufficiently
alleges that the Lisa Blake, portrayed in that chapter as a whore, refers to plain-
tiff is a matter for the court, and that the similarity of given name, physical
height, weight and build, incidental grooming habits and recreational activities
of plaintiff and Lisa Blake, a minor character in a work of fiction, are insufficient
to establish that the publication was "of and concerning" plaintiff.
Springer, 60 N.Y.2d at 918, 458 N.E.2d at 1257, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
102. Id.
103. See Garbus & Kurnit, supra note 98, at 406, n.30.
104. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 312, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247. The plaintiff and author (Tine)
were close personal friends up until completion of the draft of State of Grace in 1978. Ms.
Springer and Tine had attended Columbia University together from 1974 until 1978. The
plaintiff and the author discussed the novel's plot during its "hatching stage" and, at Tine's
request, Ms. Springer even reviewed the novel for editorial purposes. In fact, Tine told the
plaintiff that he had "loosely patterned" portions of the book on the relationship between
the two. The persons who identified Springer with Blake also knew both Tine and the plain-
tiff and the relationship between them.
105. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 317, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
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the similarities and dissimilarities between the allegedly defama-
tory work and the plaintiff."0 6
The similarities which the plaintiff emphasized included: the
physical attributes of Springer and Blake; the fact that both had
graduated from college; and that Blake had once lived on a street
where Springer now lived. 0 7 There was, however, a marked differ-
ence between the lifestyles of the plaintiff and Blake. Blake drove
a BMW automobile, earned seventy-five thousand dollars a year
and owned a co-op apartment on Fifth Avenue in New York.10 8
Springer, on the other hand, was only a college tutor. The court
inferred that as a tutor, Springer's manner of living was substan-
tially different than Blake's. 0 9
After comparing the similarities and dissimilarities between
the plaintiff and Blake, the court dismissed the defamation cause
of action. The court ultimately concluded that although the simi-
larities were "in large part superficial, the dissimilarities both in
manner of living and in outlook [were] so profound that it is virtu-
ally impossible to see how one who has read the book and who
knew Lisa Springer could attribute to Springer the lifestyle of
Blake." 10
The importance of the Springer decision lies not in its formu-
lation of the of and concerning element,"' but in its method of
determining whether the allegedly defamatory work was of and
concerning the plaintiff. The court did not base its decision only
on a review of the similarities or dissimilarities. Indeed, the
Springer court looked to both aspects and undertook a compari-
son. Only after comparing and weighing these attitudes did the
court made its determination.
IV. Bindrim AND Pring: MORE CONFUSION
As stated previously, two recent cases, Bindrim v. Mitchell" 2
and Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,"3 have injected fur-
106. Id. at 318, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
107. See Garbus & Kurnit, supra note 98, at 406, n.31.
108. Id. at 407-08.
109. Id.
110. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 320, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
111. The court in Springer noted: "for a defamatory statement or statements made
about a character in a fictional work to be actionable the description of the fictional charac-
ter must be so closely akin to the person claiming to be defamed that a reader of the book,
knowing the real person, would have no difficulty linking the two." Springer, 90 A.D.2d at
230, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
112. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
113. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'g No. C79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), cert.
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ther confusion into defamation cases based upon fictional works
and the appropriate of and concerning test to be applied thereto.
This section will offer a critical examination of these two decisions
in an effort to develop a new standard which will avoid the pitfalls
inherent in these two cases.
A. Bindrim: Indentification Through Therapy Techniques'
Bindrim v. Mitchell"" was a libel action brought by Dr. Paul
Bindrim, a psychologist, against Gwen Davis Mitchell, an author,
and her publisher for the publication of a novel entitled Touching.
Dr. Bindrim utilized a group therapy technique known as the
"Nude Marathon," wherein patients shed their inhibitions along
with their clothes."' Ms. Mitchell had attended one of Dr. Bin-
drim's sessions. Before the session, Ms. Mitchell signed an agree-
ment not to write about her experiences.11 6 Two months later,
Mitchell signed a contract with Doubleday to write Touching."'
The novel was based upon a nude psychiatric encounter ses-
sion led by Dr. Simon Herford, a fictional character. Dr. Herford
was a psychiatrist 18 who was described as being a "fat Santa Claus
type with long white hair, white sideburns, a cherubic rosy face
and rosy forearms.""' Not only were Dr. Bindrim and Dr. Herford
members of different professions, Dr. Bindrim was "clean shaven"
with "short hair. ' '1 20
However, the evidence produced at trial revealed parallels be-
tween the actual session which Ms. Mitchell attended and those
which she wrote about in her novel.' 2 ' In one incident, the novel
presented Dr. Herford's conduct as being "unprofessional."' 22 The
incident which Ms. Mitchell witnessed, however, revealed that Dr.
Bindrim's actions during the episode were cordial, respectable and
denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
114. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr, 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
115. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
116. Id. at 33-34, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
117. Id.
118. Dr. Bindrim was a psychologist. Id.
119. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
120. Id. This is in contrast to Dr. Herford's grooming preferences.
121. Id. Dr. Bindrim produced a tape recording of the actual session that Ms. Mitchell
attended and the court compared the transcript of the tape with the contents of the novel.
The parallels found between the session and those which Ms. Mitchell wrote about should
be compared to the fictionalized account of the real trial of Lieutenant Petterson. See supra
notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
122. Again, this should be compared to the characterization of Hazel Wheeler. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
19861
17
Giller: Defamation in Fiction: The Need for a Clear "Of and Concerning" S
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
18 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
professional in every way.128 The plaintiff alleged that he was de-
famed because of Mitchell's "inaccurate portrayal of what actually
happened at the marathon."124 The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. 2 '
The defendants in Bindrim argued on appeal that even if
there were untrue statements in the novel, there had been no
showing in court that the plaintiff was identified with Dr. Herford.
In support of this argument, the defendants emphasized the differ-
ences in the name, age, personality,12 physical appearance and oc-
cupations between Dr. Herford and the plaintiff.127 The physical
dissimilarities were overwhelming and yet the court was not
persuaded.
Although recognizing the existence of these differences, the
court in Bindrim simply stated that "otherwise the character Si-
mon Herford was very similar to the actual plaintiff.' 2 ' However,
the decision is devoid of any factual evidence illustrating any simi-
larities. In fact, Dr. Herford and the plaintiff shared no similar
characteristics besides the fact that "[bjoth (1) were male; (2) of-
fered Nude Marathon group therapy (as did at least ten others in
California at that time); and (3) shared a few speech
mannerisms. 12
123. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37. The opinion sets out excerpts from the
novel and the tape to illustrate the incident in question.
124. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr at 35. Since Touching was a novel it never
professed to be an accurate portrayal of what had transpired in the nude marathon session
Ms. Mitchell attended.
125. On appeal, the court did not begin its analysis by determining either whether the
novel was of and concerning the plaintiff or whether the statements in question were false
statements of fact. Rather, the first analytical approach taken by the court in Bindrim in-
volved a discussion of the presence of "actual malice" on the part of the defendants. 92 Cal.
App. 3d at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The use of this rather unique analytical focal point was
apparently fostered by the finding that Dr. Bindrim was a public figure. 92 Cal. App. 3d at
71, n.1, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35, n.1.
Utilizing the test enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the court in Bindrim
held that plaintiff had to show that the novel was written with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 71-72, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 34-35. As in Sullivan, the Bindrim court required that actual malice be shown by
clear and convincing evidence.
The Bindrim court had little difficulty finding the presence of actual malice. Relying on
the fact that the author had attended a session, and therefore knew the true facts, the court
states: "Mitchell's reckless disregard for the truth was apparent from her knowledge of the
truth of what transpired at the encounter and [its differences from] the literary portrayal of
the encounter." Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
126. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 47.
127. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75-76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
128. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
129. See Comment, supra note 91, at 421.
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In support of its finding that Dr. Herford was "of and concern-
ing" the plaintiff, the court alluded to the fact that there was
"overwhelming evidence that plaintiff and 'Herford' were one. ' 30
This so-called overwhelming evidence was comprised solely of the
testimony of only three witnesses, all of whom had participated in
or observed one of Bindrim's sessions.13 1 The only identifying char-
acteristic between Herford and Bindrim to which these three wit-
nesses all testified was that the therapeutic techniques practiced
by the plaintiff and the fictional character were similar. 32 How-
ever, as the dissent pointed out, testimony also revealed that at
least ten other professionals used encounter therapy which was
similar to the plaintiffs Nude Marathon sessions at the time in
California.'
The majority opinion speaks of the "many similarities" be-
tween the plaintiff and Herford.13 4 However, the court fails to de-
lineate these similarities. Rather, the majority seems content to
merely state that "apart from some of those episodes allegedly con-
stituting the libelous matter itself, and apart from the physical dif-
ferences and the fact that plaintiff had a Ph.D., and not an M.D.,
"1135the similarities between Herford and Bindrim are clear ... .
The court based its entire identification holding on the parallels it
found between the novel and the actual session Mitchell at-
tended." 6 In essence, the Bindrim decision stands for the proposi-
tion that in order to avoid liability, a fictional author may not re-
late identifiable personal experiences.13 7 Not only must an author
sufficiently disguise all of the physical characteristics of her fic-
tional characters she must also sufficiently conceal the underlying
events as well.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Bindrim decision is
the lack of evidence which the plaintiff produced at trial. The of
and concerning element in Bindrim was satisfied by the testimony
130. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
131. In Bindrim the court found the testimony of three friends of the plaintiff to be
dispositive of the identification issue. This should be contrasted with the holding in
Springer where, even though the author told the plaintiff that he had "loosely patterned"
portions of the book on the close friendship between the two, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. But see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 155 Cal, Rptr, at 43-44.
133. Id., 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
134. Id. at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
135. Id.
136. Id. See also text accompanying note 78 supra.
137. But see supra notes 72 and 78 and accompanying texts.
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of three friends of the plaintiff and nothing more."'8 It is not the
number of witnesses that is disturbing, but rather it is the fact that
the identification requirement was satisfied by testimony which
only revealed that the plaintiff and Herford practiced similar tech-
niques'3 9 even though there was also evidence that up to twenty-
four other therapists in California at that time practiced similar
therapeutic techniques.
B. Difficulties With Bindrim
There are two major difficulties with the Bindrim decision: (1)
it opens the door for a multiplicity of suits based upon a single
fictional work, and (2) its application of an actual malice standard
to a fictional work was improper. 40 First, by allowing the identifi-
cation requirement to be satisfied by the testimony of three per-
sonal friends of the plaintiff, all of whom based their opinions
merely upon the similarity in therapy practices, the court in Bin-
drim opened up the proverbial floodgates. Under Bindrim, a fic-
tional character could conceivably be identified with several plain-
tiffs."" Testimony in Bindrim revealed that there were possibly
two dozen therapists who all practiced therapeutic techniques sim-
ilar to those of the fictional Dr. Herford. Theoretically, the novel
Touching could have been of and concerning over twenty different
persons. Such a situation would be possible so long as each of these
othef therapists were able to produce two or three witnesses who
could identify them with the fictional character merely because of
138. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 29, n.24. See also supra note 131 and accompany-
ing text.
It is interesting to note that although the plaintiff in Pring had been identified with the
fictional character, recovery was denied in part because friends of the plaintiff testified that
the story could not have been about Ms. Pring since she would not have performed the acts
described in the article. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. In contrast, Dr. Bindrim
was allowed to recover against the defendants after three friends of the plaintiff testified
that the fictional character was "of and concerning" the plaintiff even though the court
found that Dr. Bindrim would not have acted as the fictional Dr. Herford did. See supra
notes 122-25 and accompanying texts.
139. See Comment, supra note 2, at 577, n.43. The fact that the plaintiff and Dr.
Herford practiced similar types of therapy should not have been sufficient for liability to
attach. If the author had used an acceptable archetypal literary device in Touching there is
little doubt that she could have escaped liability. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
This is especially true since Dr. Bindrim was found to be a public figure. See supra text
accompanying note 125.
140. See supra text accompanying note 125.
141. Additionally, if the decision in Bindrim was based upon the inconsistencies be-
tween the novel and the actual session that the author had attended, the holding in Wheeler
would have been reversed if decided after Bindrirn. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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the similarities in therapy styles.
Second, the Bindrim court's reliance upon New York Times,
Co. v. Sullivan is misplaced. 42 Touching did not purport to be a
factual account of a nude marathon session. The novel was simply
that, a novel. Touching was a fictionalized account of an experi-
ence Ms. Mitchell had.14 Fiction is of necessity false. Indeed, sim-
ply by virtue of its format a novel purports to be factually un-
true. 144 Yet, in a footnote, the court stated "[t]he fact that
'Touching' was a novel does not necessarily insulate Mitchell from
liability for libel. .... 1"4' The proposition cited in the footnote is
correct, however, it fails to explain the disturbing use of the Sulli-
van test, which is couched in terms of an author's knowledge or
reckless disregard for the truth, to a work which by definition is
untrue. Indeed, it has been written that the actual malice standard
of Sullivan is "meaningless when applied to works of fiction.' 1 46
C. Pring: "1 Will Know It When I See It"' 4
7
Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd. 48 was a defamation
action based upon a fanciful article entitled "Miss Wyoming Saves
the World . . . But She Blew the Contest with Her Talent,"'
49
which appeared in an issue of Penthouse magazine. The article was
a bawdy satire featuring the unique "talents" of Charlene, a con-
142. See Comment, supra note 16, at 521; see Comment, supra note 2, at 578.
The brief submitted by the plaintiff in Bindrim divided Dr. Herford's practices into two
categories: (1) those which were similar were classified as "identifying," and (2) those which
were dissimilar were alleged to be libelous because they were false. Stated differently, the
similarities between the plaintiff and the fictional character were said to satisfy the of and
concerning requirement while the dissimilarities were deemed to be defamatory.
143. See supra note 124. But see supra note 78.
144. See Comment, supra note 29, at 446-47.
145. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73, n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. 29 at 35, n.2.
146. See, Comment, supra note 16, at 526.
147. I have taken the liberty of paraphrasing somewhat, Justice Stewart's oft-cited
quotation from Jacobellis. See supra note 87.
"I Will Know It When I See It" is used as a heading for the section of this Article,
which analyzes Pring, for several reasons. First of all, the court in Pring failed to delineate
how to determine whether a fictional work is "fanciful" enough to avoid liability. Second, in
so failing to develop a clear and simple standard, the court in Pring may be said to have
engaged in nothing more than an "I will know it when I see it" analysis.
148. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
149. Cioffari, Miss America Saves the World ... But She Blew the Contest With Her
Talent, Penthouse, Aug., 1979 at 155.
The article was written by Dr. Phillip Cioffari, a university professor with a Ph.D. in
English. It is interesting to note that Dr. Cioffari "had actually attended the Miss America
Pageant at which the real Miss Wyoming performed .... " Gora, Introduction: Literature,
Life, and the Law, 51 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 225, 227 (1985).
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testant in the Miss America pageant.' 50 Charlene was the reigning
Miss Wyoming and her talent in the contest was twirling a baton.
.The article described Miss Wyoming's thoughts as she was
about to perform her baton routine during the talent portion of the
pageant. Before going onstage, Charlene remembers an incident in
high school where she performed fellatio on a football player at her
school, causing him to levitate. " Two other incidents regarding
Miss Wyoming's sexual "talents" were also described in the article.
First, Charlene stopped the band by performing a fellatio-like act
on her baton while on stage. The other episode occurred at the end
of the stage while the finalists were center stage. There, before a
nationally televised audience, 52 Miss Wyoming performed fellatio
on her coach causing him to levitate as well.
The reigning Miss Wyoming at the time the article was pub-
lished, Kimberli Jayne Pring, brought an action for defamation
against Penthouse and the author. Ms. Pring, who had become the
"brunt of many jokes,"' 3 alleged that the article created the im-
pression that she actually performed the acts related therein.15 4
The trial court awarded Ms. Pring fourteen million dollars in dam-
ages against Penthouse and thirty-five thousand dollars against the
author. "
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit formulated the issues as: (1)
"whether the publication was about the plaintiff, that is, whether
it was of and concerning her as a matter of identify," and (2)
"whether the story must reasonably be understood as describing
actual facts or events about the plaintiff or actual conduct of the
plaintiff."' 56 The duality of these issues ultimately collapsed into a
single inquiry of whether the article presented false statements of
fact. This is because the jury had determined that the article was
in fact "of and concerning" Ms. Pring, and the weight of the evi-
dence presented at trial left the Tenth Circuit with no choice but
to affirm that determination. 5 7 Consequently, the central issue on
appeal was "whether the story must reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts or events about the plaintiff or actual con-
150. The satirical aspect of the article was the suggestion that Charlene might "'save
the world' with her real talents... [as] an ambassador of love and peace." 695 F.2d at 441.
151. Id.
152. The court noted that the "television cameras were not on the new Miss America
but 'remained' on Charlene and her coach who was then rising into the air .... Id.
153. See Comment, supra note 91, at 424.
154. 695 F.2d at 441.
155. See Comment, supra note 91, at 423, n.195.
156. 695 F.2d at 439.
157. Id. at 442. See Comment, supra note 16, at 541-42, n.86..
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duct of the plaintiff.""' The court expressed this in terms of a
"reasonably understood" element.
One writer has criticized Pring because of the appellate court's
failure to re-analyze the of and concerning element.' 59 Indeed, it
has been suggested that the author merely used an acceptable ar-
chetypal literary device and therefore, the article was not "of and
concerning" the plaintiff, regardless of what the jury found. 60 The
similarities between the plaintiff and Charlene were that both had
coaches named Corky, both were baton twirlers, both wore blue
outfits during the talent competition and both held the title of
Miss Wyoming.' 61 There were, however, also many dissimilarities.
They included: the fact that their names were different; they had
attended different high schools; their high school friends had dif-
ferent names; the year of their reign was different; and the style of
their costumes was different. 6 ' The appellate decision failed to ad-
dress the identification element at all, choosing instead to merely
affirm the district court's finding that the article was indeed "of
and concerning" the plaintiff.
The lower court's judgment and award of damages in favor of
Ms. Pring was reversed on appeal. The reversal was based primar-
ily upon what the Tenth Circuit viewed as the utter unbelievability
of the incidents depicted in the article. The defendants argued
that the article was "complete fantasy which could not be taken
literally."' 6 The court correctly noted that, by itself, the charac-
terization of a work as fiction is not dispositive, and formulated the
test as: "Whether the charged portions [when read] in context
could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about
the plaintiff of actual events in which she participated. If it could
not be so understood, the charged portions could not be taken
literally.' 4
Applying this test to the article in Penthouse, the court had
little difficulty finding that the article could not reasonably be un-
derstood as describing actual facts or events. The court stated "it
was readily apparent. . . that [the article] was all fanciful and did
158. 695 F.2d at 439.
159. See Comment, supra note 91, at 424.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 425.
162. Id. Rather than merely determining that the dissimilarities were controlling, the
better approach is to examine and weigh both the similarities and the dissimilarities as the
court did in Springer. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
163. 695 F.2d at 439.
164. Id. at 442; see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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not purport to be a factual account."'165 In short, the Pring court
held that although all but the "charged portions" of the article
were believable and allowed readers to identify the plaintiff as the
fictional character, there was no liability since the author imputed
the reputation of Ms. Pring in such a spectacular and unbelievable
fashion.1 6
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the majority, found three aspects
of the article to be important. First, the court characterized the
incidents of fellatio coupled with levitation as being "impossibility
and fantasy within a fanciful story."'1 7 Second, Chief Judge Seth
found it "significant" that the final incident of fellatio was nation-
ally televised, stating "[t]his in itself would seem to provide a suffi-
cient signal that the story could not be taken literally, [that is]
could not be reasonably understood as a statement of fact."' 68 Fi-
nally, the court buttressed its opinion by citing the testimony of
members of the community who knew Ms. Pring and who all testi-
fied that the story could not possibly have been about her since she
would not have performed the acts described in the article. 6 '
Viewing the article as a whole, the Tenth Circuit found that it was
simply "impossible to believe that a reader would not have under-
stood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing
else.' 1 70 In sum, the court held "the incidents charged were impos-
sible [and] [t]he setting was impossible.' 1 '
165. 695 F.2d at 441. Once again, since the article was a fictional work it would be
readily apparent that it was not a "factual account." However, simply because a fictional
work is not a factual account has not, by itself, precluded liability being established for
defamatory statements found therein.
It is interesting to note that the Tenth Circuit found the Penthouse article to be a
"gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss America contest and con-
testants .... " 695 F.2d at 443. Similarly, the court held that the story had "no redeeming
features whatever." Id.
166. 695 F.2d at 441. It is this author's opinion that if a fictional work similar to the
one involved in Pring had been written about the wife of a Tenth Circuit judge, liability
would have been found regardless of the spectacular and unbelievable nature of the defama-
tory portions.
167. 695 F.2d at 441.
168. Id. This holding is similar to the position taken by the court in both Notre Dame
and Middlebrooks.
169. 695 F.2d at 441-42. But see supra text accompanying note 138.
170. 695 F.2d at 443. Is it not possible that Ms. Pring was "defamed" by the imputa-
tion of promiscuity implicit within the Penthouse article regardless of the fact that her
"talent" resulted in levitation? Indeed, the court noted that Ms. Pring had become the
brunt of many jokes. So, is not the reputational harm caused by accusations of engaging in
acts of fellatio and public exhibitionism sufficient to find the existence of libel?
171. 695 F.2d at 443.
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D. Difficulties With Pring
The problems with the Pring decision are twofold: (1) it en-
ables authors of fiction to avoid liability by sufficiently embel-
lishing identifying elements of a work with fantastic or unbelieve-
able acts;172 and (2) it places a virtuous plaintiff in the precarious
position of having to show that those aspects of the article which
are similar thereby identify her with the fictional character, while
at the same time having to allege that the unflattering and dissimi-
lar aspects of the article defamed her.173
The dissent in Pring pointed out that the Penthouse article
was not pure fantasy, but rather it combined both fact and fiction.
As Judge Breitenstein so poignantly stated: "I consider levitation,
dreams, and public performance as fiction. Fellatio is not.' 17 4 In-
deed, it is the imputation of promiscuity attendant fellatio which is
defamatory, not the act of levitation. The fact that the author
chose to combine the two does not make the defamation any less.
As the dissent further noted "Penthouse cannot escape liability by
relying on the fantasy used to embellish the fact . . . . Responsi-
bility for an irresponsible and reckless statement of fact, fellatio,
may not be avoided by the gratuitous addition of fantasy.' ' 7 5
The Pring decision amply illustrates that an author need only
embellish the story with fantastic or impossible feats to avoid lia-
bility, regardless of how damaging the facts in the story are to the
plaintiff's reputation. Thus, while a fictional character may be
readily identifiable with a real life person, simply because that
character has engaged in some impossible activity, the plaintiff will
be denied recovery even though her reputation has been injured.
Yet another disturbing aspect of the Pring decision is that the
jury found that the article was in fact "of and concerning" the
172. One writer has noted that the broad holding of Pring enables a "mischievous
fictionist to escape liability for defamation merely by presenting impossible feats in bizarre
settings." Comment, supra note 91, at 423.
173. This situation has led one commentator to write:
On the one hand, the plaintiff must assert simultaneously that the story or novel
is "about" him or her to the extent that there are similarities between the plain-
tiff and the fictional character but "could not be about" the plaintiff because, in
real life, he or she would never do the scandalous things ascribed to the charac-
ter. The plaintiff's case thus becomes: "It's me, but it couldn't be me."
Gora, supra note 149, at 228 (citation omitted).
174. 659 F.2d at 443 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 444. Judge Breitenstein's comment that "Penthouse cannot escape liability
by relying on the fantasy used to embellish the fact" is similar to the statement in Corrigan
that an author cannot escape liability by the "varnish of fiction." See Corrigan, 228 N.Y. at
72, 126 N.E. at 263.
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plaintiff.17 6 However, simply because the witnesses who identified
Charlene with Ms. Pring testified that the plaintiff would not en-
gage in public exhibitionism, Ms. Pring was denied recovery. Such
a situation has been described as a "disturbing irony.'1 77 On the
one hand, a plaintiff is required to prove that the fictional charac-
ter was "of and concerning" the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the
plaintiff establishes the similarities between the two people. Con-
currently, however, the plaintiff must also show that the fictional
work contains false statements of fact which defamed the plaintiff,
i.e., prove that the dissimilarities have harmed her reputation.
This irony led the court in Geisler v. Petrocelli to note:
The more virtuous the victim of the libel the less likely it will be
that she will be able to establish this essential confusion in the
mind of the third party. Thus, the more deserving the plaintiff
of recompense for the tarnishing of a spotless reputation, the
less likely will be any actual recovery. 178
V. THE NEED FOR A CLEAR "Of And Concerning" Standard
It is readily apparent that the of and concerning standards
ennunciated by the various courts have been anything but consis-
tent. This situation has been described as a "fully grown Problem-
In-Need-Of-A-Solution, replete with numerous suggestions on how
the Problem ought to be solved. 179 The earliest cases looked to
whether the plaintiff was the intended object of the fictional work,
thereby implicitly embracing an intent element. 80 The standards
developed by subsequent cases fall into one of two categories: (1) a
version of the "reasonable reader" standard;k 8 ' or (2) a "fiction is
fiction" standard. 82 In the first group of decisions, the court's fo-
176. See supra note 156. Traditionally, such a finding necessarily meant judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
177. See Comment, supra note 16, at 532.
178. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d at 639.
179. Schauer, Liars, Novelists, and the Law of Defamation, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 233,
235 (1985).
180. In Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 44, the court allowed the jury to determine whether rea-
sonable readers would understand that the plaintiff was the intended object of the story.
Similarly, the court in Corrigan, 29 T.L.R. at 129, held that the author of the fictional work
"intended... deliberately and with personal malice to vilify the plaintiff." Id. See supra
notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
181. See Fetler, Geisler, Kelly, Davis, Wheeler and Springer, all discussed above.
182. In Notre Dame, the court formulated the issue on appeal to be "whether there
[is] any basis for any inference on the part of rational readers or viewers that the antics
engaging their attention are anything more than fiction .. " 22 A.D.2d at 452, 256 N.Y.2d
at 304. Although the court in Middlebrooks utilized a version of the reasonable reader test,
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cus is upon whether reasonable readers would believe that the fic-
tional character was a portrayal of the plaintiff.18 3 In contrast, the
attention of the courts in the second category of cases is primarily
upon the work itself and whether reasonable readers would believe
that the fictional and unbelieveable aspects of the work described
actual facts about the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff.1 84
The decisions involving involving variations on the reasonable
reader standard may be subdivided even further. Some cases em-
ploy a "pure" reasonable reader standard, 18 5 while others utilize a
standard which includes such vague terms as a "considerable and
respectable class in the community""8 6 or a "respectable and sub-
stantial part of the community. 18 7 Still other courts require that
persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasonably iden-
tify the fictional character with the plaintiff. 8'
Although courts applying a "fiction is fiction" standard speak
of the perceptions of "rational readers,"189 or the reasonable under-
standing of the audience, 90 the emphasis is clearly upon the work
itself rather than upon the understanding of the readers. Such an
emphasis is, however, somewhat uncertain. For example, the court
in Middlebrooks referred to "obvious" works of fiction and how
they are understood as such by readers.191 The fiction is fiction test
is too subjective. It enables authors to escape liability merely by
embellishing fact with fiction.192 Such a standard is unacceptable.
Courts should not be allowed to make a "gut reaction"193 on
they also noted: "obvious works of fiction are normally understood by all reasonable men as
not intended to depict or refer to any actual person." 413 F.2d at 143. Finally, in Pring, the
court inquired as to whether the fictional work could reasonably be understood as describing
actual facts or events about the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff.
183. This characterization also encompasses, to a certain degree, Jones and Corrigan,
even though those cases spoke of intent on the part of the author to portray or vilify the
plaintiff.
184. See supra note 182.
185. See generally, supra notes 66-78 and 92-97 and accompany text.
186. See Wright, 55 F. Supp. at 640 (the communities where the movie was shown).
187. See Kelly, 76 F. Supp. at 474 (the community to which the statement was
addressed).
188. See generally, Davis, 191 F.2d at 902; Wheeler, 300 F.2d at 373 and Springer, 60
N.Y.2d at 917, 458 N.E.2d at 1256, 470 N.Y.S. at 580. One author has stated that in order to
eliminate "the possibility of liability in cases of accidental reference.., it should be incum-
bent on the plaintiff to show that the defendant in fact drew upon knowledge about the
plaintiff in writing the novel or other work of fiction." See Schauer, supra note 179, at 259.
189. Notre Dame, 22 A.D.2d at 452, 256 N.Y.2d at 301.
190. Middlebrooks, 413 F.2d at 141.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 173.
193. See Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1980).
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whether they believe that a fictional work includes enough fantas-
tic aspects to ensure that reasonable readers understand that the
work is not intended to depict actual persons or happenings. 9'
Numerous commentators have offered a variety of suggestions
on how the of and concerning standard should be worded. One
writer has proposed that the of and concerning requirement
"should be subject to a 'clear and convincing' standard of proof."195
Another author suggested that an element of "unmistakability"
should be added to the standard.' 9a Finally, Professor LeBel has
gone so far as to propose the development of a new and distinct
tort to handle injuries caused by works of fiction. 197 All of these
suggestions, however, suffer from the same infirmity. By introduc-
ing new terms and new concepts into the of and concerning analy-
sis, these proposals will only add to the already confused state of
this area of the law. What is needed is a simpler and more prag-
matic approach; an approach that will avoid adding vague terms to
the standard, while at the same time keep the determination of
identify "in the hands" of the jury.
The of and concerning standard proposed by this Article is
twofold: (1) whether the fictional work, when read as a whole,
could be understood by a reasonable reader as depicting an actual
person or persons and/or actual events, despite assurances by the
author and publisher to the contrary; and (2) whether the fictional
character at issue could be understood by a reasonable reader as
referring specifically to the named plaintiff. 98 This test involves
two levels of inquiry. First, the trier of fact must determine
whether the work, when read as a whole, could be understood as
194. Id.
195. See Schauer, supra note 179, at 259.
196. See Comment, supra note 16, at 538-39.
197. LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a
Theory of Liability, 51 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 281 (1985) Professor LeBel has suggested the
establishment of a new tort for offensive fictional portrayals. Id. at 299-338. Cf., Zimmer-
man, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About Troublesome Old Torts Poured Into
New Jugs, 51 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 355 (1985).
Professor LeBel writes: "Rather than searching for a bright line indicator of identifica-
tion to distinguish between meritorious and nonmeritorious claims, courts should approach
this factor from a pragmatic perspective. Such an approach should focus on the purpose of
the inquiry, namely, to determine whether the particular plaintiff is someone who ought to
have access to relief for harm allegedly caused by the defendant's published work of fiction."
See LeBel, supra note 197, at 308.
198. The standard proposed by this Comment represents a synthesis of the standard
enunciated by the court in E. Hulton Co. v. Jones [1909] 2 K.B. 44, aff'd, [19101 A.C. 20,
and the test set forth in Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980). See also, Com-
ment, Defamation in Fiction, supra note 15 at 103.
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describing actual persons and events. Only after determining that
the work could be so understood by a reasonable reader will an
inquiry be conducted into whether the fictional character at issue
refers specifically to the plaintiff.
Both prongs of the proposed test refer to the understandings
and perceptions of a "reasonable reader." This unique animal is
simply a variation of the "reasonable man" standard utilized in
negligence cases. 199 In discussing the attributes of the reasonable
man, Professor Prosser wrote:
He is not to be identified with any ordinary individual ... he is
a prudent and careful man, who is always up to standard. Nor is
it proper to identify him even with any member of the very jury
who are to apply the standard; he is rather a personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the
jury's social judgment.'"
Since the reasonable reader standard is a community standard, 0'
the introduction of such vague terms as a "considerable and re-
spectable class in the community" or a "respectable and substan-
tial part of the community" are redundant and therefore
unnecessary. 202
Specific reference in the proposed test to the understandings
of a reasonable reader represents a return to a simpler and more
pragmatic approach to the determination of whether a fictional
work is "of and concerning" a real person. The proposed test em-
ploys a "pure" reasonable reader standard which does not encom-
pass any qualifying terminology, nor does it require that persons
who knew or knew of the plaintiff be able to identify the fictional
character with the plaintiff. Indeed, under this new standard, the
trier of fact need only determine the understandings and percep-
tions of a reasonable reader who has read the entire work.
The first prong of the proposed of and concerning standard is
similar to the "fiction is fiction" test employed by various courts.208
However, the difficulties inherent in prior "fiction is fiction" stan-
dards2 04 are alleviated by the new test. First, the new standard
199. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 32 at 149-66. It has been written that "this excel-
lent but odious character stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice vainly appealing
to his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example." Id. at 150, n.21 (citation
omitted).
200. Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
201. Id. § 33 at 166.
202. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
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seeks to enlarge the scope of inquiry necessary to determine
whether the work could be understood as describing actual persons
and events. Previous decisions involving a "fiction is fiction" stan-
dard limited the inquiry to only those incidents of the fictional
work involving the character at issue, rather than focusing on the
work as a whole. Such a limitation has allowed courts to base their
decisions on nothing more than a "gut reaction."2 °5
In Pring,20 6 the court noted that the "central issue "207 on ap-
peal was "whether the story must reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts or events about plaintiff or actual conduct
of the plaintiff. ' 20 8 Although recognizing that this was a "matter to
be determined from the story as a whole,"209 the court in Pring
nonetheless limited its inquiry to only the "charged portions of the
story. '210 By narrowing its focus to those aspects of the work that
the plaintiff claimed were defamatory, the court easily concluded
that "it is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not
have understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and
nothing else. 2 11 However, it is readily apparent that this conclu-
sion represented the "gut reaction" of the appellate panel rather
than the perceptions and understandings of a reasonable reader.
This is evidenced by the fact that "the trial court had decided the
story generally was not fiction ....
By limiting the focus of inquiry to only the "charged portions
of the story," the court in Pring implicitly ruled that a writer may
escape liability by embellishing the defamatory content of his work
with fantastic feats, regardless of the tenor of the work as a whole.
Under the proposed standard, such a result would be avoided. The
new test requires that a determination first be made as to whether
the work, when read as a whole, could be understood by a reasona-
ble reader as depicting an actual person or persons and/or actual
events. Application of the first prong of the proposed standard to
the facts in Pring would have resulted in a ruling that a reasonable
reader could understand the article, when read as a whole, as in-
volving actual persons and/or actual events.2 13 This is not to say,
205. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
206. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
207. Id. at 440.
208. Id. at 439.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 443.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 442.
213. The article in Pring was described by the court as "a gross, unpleasant, crude,
distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss America contest and contestants." Id. at 443. Since
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however, that the end result in Pring would have been any differ-
ent under the new test, only that the first prong of the proposed
standard would have been satisfied. Once the first prong of the
new test has been fulfilled, the trier of fact must then determine
whether the fictional character at issue could be understood by a
reasonable reader as referring specifically to the named plaintiff.
The second part of the proposed standard requires a balancing
of certain factors; it demands a comparison of both the similarities
and dissimilarities between the fictional character and the named
plaintiff. Neither factor alone should be dispositive of whether a
reasonable reader would understand the fictional character to be a
portrayal of the plaintiff. Only after a detailed comparison of the
similarities and dissimilarities may the trier of fact adequately
weigh the evidence and determine the understandings and percep-
tions of a reasonable reader. It would be helpful if the judge and/or
jury would document this balancing process and actually list the
similarities and dissimilarities between the fictional character and
the plaintiff, indicating which factors they found to be controlling.
Because the second prong of the proposed standard is con-
cerned with whether the fictional character may be understood as a
portrayal of the plaintiff, the focus of inquiry should be on the
physical and mental characteristics of the two persons rather than
upon the activities engaging the attention of the fictional charac-
ter. While inquiry may be made into the similarities and dissimi-
larities between the conduct of the fictional character and that of
the plaintiff, the primary focus should be on the physical and
mental characteristics of the two persons. If it is apparent to a rea-
sonable reader that the fictional character looks and thinks like the
plaintiff, the latter should not be penalized merely because the au-
thor has chosen to engage the fictional character in conduct in
which the plaintiff would never have taken part. By so limiting the
balancing process, the "disturbing irony" of prior cases is
avoided.214
Clearly, while the conduct of a fictional character should not
defeat a plaintiff's claim for relief, the court may consider such evi-
dence in establishing whether a reasonable reader would under-
stand the fictional character to be a portrayal of the plaintiff. In
the article involved an actual beauty pageant with contestants who represented actual
states, it is safe to assume, as the district court found, that the first prong of the new test
would be satisfied by this fictional work. However, it is unclear from the reported decision
whether the article was mostly "fantasy" or whether the fantastic aspects of the article were
merely interspersed throughout the work.
214. See supra notes 177 and 178 and accompanying text.
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other words, the activities of a fictional character may help to sat-
isfy the second prong of the new test, but they may not be used to
invalidate any nexus between the fictional character and the plain-
tiff. For example, even though the fictional Dr. Herford was physi-
cally quite dissimilar to the plaintiff in Bindrim, the second part of
the new test could still have been satisfied if the trier of fact deter-
mined that a reasonable reader could identify the fictional charac-
ter as depicting the plaintiff based upon similarities in occupa-
tional techniques. In contrast, the conduct of the fictional
characters in Middlebrooks and Pring should not have defeated
the claims presented simply because the plaintiffs in those cases
would not have engaged in such activities. 1 5
It must be remembered that the test proposed by this Article
is confined to the of and concerning element of defamation in fic-
tion cases. Once it has been established that a fictional work is "of
and concerning" the plaintiff, the remaining elements of a cause of
action for defamation must still be established. One writer has pro-
posed the following test for establishing the defamatory nature of a
fictional work:
The falsity of the defamatory language would be measured by
the reasonable reader test. Would a reasonable reader believe
that the conduct or characteristics ascribed to the character in
fact were true of the plaintiff? If the answer is yes, then the
plaintiff has shown that he has been defamed. " "
215. In Middlebrooks, the district court found that the story "describes the character
'Esco Brooks' as having committed acts indictable as crimes under the laws of South Caro-
lina and the United States. It also describes 'Esco Brooks' as an irresponsible, undepend-
able, and dishonest person who ... is a 'very fast liar.'" Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 281 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.S.C. 1968). The witnesses produced by the plaintiff in Mid-
dlebrooks all testified that "they did not believe that plaintiff had ever engaged in such
escapades . . . or that he possessed the bad and undesirable traits attributable to 'Esco
Brooks.'" Id. at 6.
Similarly, the article in Pring described the fictional character as performing fellatio
upon two different men, one incident being before a live national television audience, as well
as committing fellatio like acts upon her baton at the Miss America contest. 695 F.2d at 441.
However, the witnesses produced by the plaintiff "all testified that the story could not pos-
sibly be about her as she would not do that." Id. at 441-42 (emphasis in original).
216. See Comment, Defamation in Fiction, supra note 15, at 443. The standard pro-
posed by that author involved two separate questions. The questions as applied to Bindrim
were: (1) whether a reasonable reader would believe that the plaintiff used vulgar and abu-
sive language, and (2) whether the plaintiff did in fact use such language. If the answer to
the first question was yes, and the answer to the second question was no, then the plaintiff
would have proven his case for defamatory content. Application of these same questions to
Pring results in: (1) would a reasonable reader believe that the plaintiff performed acts of
fellatio at the Miss America contest, and (2) did the plaintiff in fact perform such acts.
Although no reasonable reader would believe that the plaintiff levitated anyone during the
act of fellatio, a reasonable reader might infer the plaintiff was promiscuous. If a reasonable
[Vol. 3:1
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Applying the law of defamation to fictional works has resulted
in less than fifty reported cases. Yet, among this relative handful
of cases there is little consistency in the formulation of an of and
concerning standard. In fact, an examination of these decisions
reveals several inconsistent rationales used by the courts. While
most tribunals have used a reasonable reader standard to deter-
mine whether a fictional work is "of and concerning" the plaintiff,
this has not been altogether satisfactory. Courts have introduced
vague terms into the analysis, thereby serving only to perpetuate
the myriad of contradictory decisions. The recent cases of Bindrim
and Pring magnify the inconsistency of the present case law.
Underscoring all of this lies a sense that the existing of and
concerning standards are unsatisfactory; that courts, and the par-
ties to these lawsuits, need guidance in defining a simple and prag-
matic approach to determining whether a fictional character may
be identified with a particular plaintiff. The standard must serve
both the first amendment interests of the writer and the interests
of the individual plaintiff in maintaining his privacy and reputa-
tion. To accomplish this task a new of and concerning standard is
proposed, whereby the trier of fact must decide: (1) whether the
fictional work, when read as a whole, could be understood by a
reasonable reader as depicting an actual person or persons and/or
actual events, despite assurances by the author and the publisher
to the contrary; and (2) whether the fictional character at issue
could be understood by a reasonable reader as referring specifically
to the named plaintiff.2 17
reader believed either that the plaintiff performed these sexual acts or that she was promis-
cuous, and those charges were in fact false, then the plaintiff would have been defamed. Id.
at 443-44.
217. The standard proposed by this Article is not offered to alleviate all of the
problems implicit in prior decisions. However, a uniform of and concerning standard is nec-
essary and desirable. The new test, if adopted, should provide such uniformity while at the
same time remain flexible. The flexibility of the rule lies in its adoption of a "pure" reasona-
ble reader standard. What is reasonable to a reader in 1986 may or may not be reasonable to
a reader in the year 2000.
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